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Abstract
The evolution of trustworthiness as a major aspect of business ethics
depends crucially on whether it can be signaled  If this is impossible only
opportunistic traders will survive  Whereas previous studies have analysed
detection agencies Gth and Kliemt  and  or have substituted
signaling by ex post	punishment e g  in the form of courts Brennan Gth
Kliemt 
a and b we here introduce the institution of banks which can
guarantee payment  It is shown that this can crowd in trustworthiness
i e  trustworthy traders can survive in the evolutionary race  Compared
to detection agencies the result may however be both crowding out and
crowding in of business ethics  The crucial feature is the banks ability
to discriminate between trustworthy and unreliable debtors which in our
model is formally captured by the probability dierence of accepting their
respective credit applications 
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A major weakness of most neoclassical studies of market interaction is that their
predictions depend on the rules of the game which
 at best
 can be partly known
or found out by empirical research An especially dicult rule aspect are the pref
erences of the interacting parties
 eg the degree by which their market behavior
is constrained by business ethics
Indirect evolution Gth and Yaari
   allows to derive the rules governing
social interaction instead of imposing them exogenously The method is a two
stepprocedure One rst determines the behavior for all possible rule constella
tions and then studies the evolution of rules Only the evolutionarily stable rules
should be expected In case of rules specifying preferences only the evolutionarily
stable business ethics will prevail when one neglects transitory phases
Our analysis continues the previous research by Gth and Kliemt  
  

 	 as well as by Brennan
 Gth
 and Kliemt  a and b who have analysed
the evolution of trustworthiness for the simple game of trust In this game a
rst mover here a seller can trust the other the second mover
 in the case at
hand the buyer or refrain from cooperation Whereas the latter decision ends the
game
 it continues after trust with the buyers decision to pay or not What is
studied evolutionarily is whether or not a conscience evolves preventing the buyer
from not paying
The result depends crucially on what the seller knows about the buyer s type
Only trustworthy buyers will survive if the seller can recognize the buyers type
If
 however
 only the buyer knows his type
 ie in case of private type information

the opposite is true only opportunistic exploiters
 who do not pay the price
 win
the evolutionary race see Gth and Kliemt
  




 perfect signaling of types or no type signaling are just the extremes
In actual life we sometimes are able to deduce something about others types and

sometimes we are not
 usually depending on ones own eorts to acquire infor
mation Gth and Kliemt   and  	 have analysed detection agencies
who at some cost can provide more or less reliable type signals If the costs are
nonprohibitive and if the type signals are informative enough
 there exists a sta
ble bimorphism




 and Kliemt  a and b do not rely on detection agencies
 but
on courts to which the seller can appeal in case of exploitation An interesting
aspect of their analysis is that the judge is randomly drawn from the same pop
ulation as the buyer and that the legal verdict depends on the judges type The
results are compared to those of detection agencies
Our analysis here was inspired by Schils  	 who suggests to view the basic
game of trust as a sales transaction and to introduce banks which can guarantee
that the seller will receive the sales price Of course
 this may only transform the
problem of buyer reliability into one of debtors trustworthiness Banks
 further
more
 can only survive when they do not make losses
Introducing banks allows to study whether such an institution will crowd in or out
business ethics in the form of trustworthy buyers and debtors and also to compare
it to detection agencies
 studied previously by Gth and Kliemt   and  	
The crucial feature of banks will be their ability to distinguish between trustworthy
and unreliable debtors In our model
 which avoids to model the bank as a player

this ability is formally captured by the possibly dierent probabilities of granting
a credit or guarantee to trustworthy and unreliable applicants
 respectively
In the following section  the trust game with bank is introduced whose possible
solutions are derived in section  whereas section  looks at the condition that
the bank is making no loss How to explore the evolution of trustworthiness is
discussed in section 
 
 and  Banks can enhance
 ie crowd in business ethics

but also
 when compared to detection agencies
 crowd them out Section 	 looks
at mixed strategy equilibria Section  concludes by summarizing our results and
indicating possible lines of future research

 The trust game with bank
Let us start by introducing the basic game of trust which is graphically repre
sented in Figure II  where the nonnegative payo parameters the upperlower
payo is the one of the sellerbuyer must satisfy












































































































































































































































































Figure II The basic game of trust
Here N stands for Not trading T for T rust the buyer The buyer rewards
sellers trust by Reward the seller
 namely by paying the price p In case of
Exploit the seller he
 however
 keeps the commoditywhich he values at v without
paying r and s are the prots of the seller
 respectively the buyer
 when not
trading




 not true for payo parameter m which just represents
the buyers feelings of remorse after exploiting the seller for a more general
discussion of such intrinsic motivation see Frey
   We will refer to m as the
buyer s conscience parameter Our task will be to derive the evolutionarily
stable conscience
 ie we do not impose restrictions for m
 but try to derive them
For the purpose of this study business ethics are restricted to whether m prevents

exploitation of others or not Which business ethics nally prevail will not be
imposed exogenously
 but endogenously derived
The payos in Figure II  are the players cardinal utilities which can be stan
dardized by choosing the levels and the units of the utility scales To simplify
our analysis we can therefore redene the payos by assuming
II p   and s   
so that II  becomes
II  v      r    
In case of m   
 ie of no conscience
 the buyer would exploit choose E so
that the seller prefers N over T  In case of m  m satisfying v m  v    or
II m   
the buyer would
 however
 pay the price Restricting attention to the two possible
types m  m and m    the result is
II

TR for m  m   
NE for m   
when the seller knows the buyers mtype
Let us now assume that the population of buyers is composed of a qshare of
mtypes whereas the complementary share   q are all m   types Thus if the
buyers mtype is private information
 the seller will expect an m  mtype
with probability q and an m   type with probability    q Representing the
sellers incomplete information by a ctitious initial chance Harsanyi
   	
move allows us to graphically illustrate this situation as in Figure II which relies
on the standardized parameters of II The task of endogenizing m by studying















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure II The basic game of trust with no type information
the population share q of trustworthy buyers This is done by rst solving all
games with q     and then studying the evolution of q
 ie by studying the
development of q over time
Since m    chooses R and m    the move E
 the expected payo maximiz
ing seller will rely on T if
II q   r
It can be shown see Gth and Kliemt
   and   that onlymtypes survive in
case of Figure II 
 ie when the buyers type is known
 whereas only m   types
survive when the buyers type is private information Thus the evolutionarily
stable population composition is q    in case of Figure II  and q     in case
of Figure II
Now when m is private information
 T is chosen only when q   r In this range
of the population share q the opportunistic m   buyers fare strictly better than
the trustworthy mtypes so that q should decline rapidly In the range q  r when
the seller prefers N over T 
 the further decline can be justied by rare mistakes

in the sense of unintentional trust see Gth and Kliemt
   and   This

however
 implies that the decline of q in the range    q  r is rather slow
Let us now introduce a bank which may help to engage in trade even when the
trustworthiness of the buyer is uncertain When representing the trust game
with bank we neglect the dominated move E of m  m and R of m    to
simplify the game tree see Figure II
Before engaging in trade the buyer
 who is aware of the sellers trust problem

can ask for a credit guaranteeing that the seller will receive the price But
 of
course
 this only transforms the problem of buyer reliability into one of debtors
trustworthiness The game of trust with bank
 as graphically illustrated by
Figure II
 does not introduce the bank as an additional player Rather it is
assumed that a credit application by m  m will be granted with probability x
whereas an application by m    is accepted with probability y where
II    x  y    
In case of x   y the bank can better detect the buyers type than the seller In the
limiting case x  y the bank is as bad in type detection as the seller Although we
do not introduce the bank as a player
 its mere existence preassumes
 of course

that it does not make a loss
If the buyer asks for a credit the move C in Figure II
 the notation C x

respectively C y
 means that the credit is granted only with probability x
 re
spectively y With probability  x or  y the result is as if the buyer would not
have asked at all for the credit
 ie as if move C would have been chosen After C
the seller with no bank guarantee we refer to him as the seller agent S plays the
game of trust with no type information of Figure II If
 however
 the credit is
granted
 the seller agent s with a guaranteed price can choose between trade or
no trade After n the game ends whereas it continues with the mtypes choices
between P aying the price and P not paying











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure II The reduced game of trust with bank after the choice of T type
ms move E and type  s move R are neglected
I cost of credit guarantee
I cost of credit use including I
D security deposit which is lost for the buyer
in case of not paying the price
It will be assumed that
II v     I
 I   I    
    I D    
 and D    
holds which implies that   I   I D Thus the m   type of the buyer uses
P instead of P whereas an mtype
 satisfying
II	 m  I D     I   

chooses P instead of P  Furthermore




 he is sure to receive the price Eliminating all these dominated moves yields
the further reduced game of trust with bank which is graphically described by
Figure II
In the following this game with only three decision makers
 namely the m  m
and the m   type of the buyer as well as the buyer agent S without price
guarantee
 will be analysed rst by solving the game and then by analysing the
evolution of q







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure II The further reduced game of trust with bank compared to Figure
II the dominated moves n for s
 P for m
 and P for m    are neglected
 Solutions
Let  and  denote the probability by which m  m
 respectivelym   
 chooses
C These probabilities determine the posterior probability of seller agent S for
confronting the mtype of the buyer according to
III  q    q x 
q x qy 
Now seller S prefers T over N if
III q     r

whereas N is better if
III q    r
In case of III both mtypes of the buyer would choose C
 ie      
 so
that III becomes
III q      q   r
Proposition 
In case of q   r no buyer type asks for the credit since both seller agents S and
s rely on trust the move T  respectively t
Consider now the case III when S uses N  Due to the parameter restriction
II the mtype of the buyer then prefers C x over C
 ie    Since the
conditions in II imply that v   I D also the m   type of the buyer avoids
C
 ie    Condition III thus becomes
III q    qx
qxqy  r
or
III q  yryrrx 
In case of x  y
 ie when the bank cannot dierentiate at all between the
m  m and the m   type of the buyer
 the left handside of III would be
equal to q whereas it is smaller than q for x   y Together with Proposition  
this proves
Proposition 
i If x  yand q   r or x   yand r  q   both m types of the buyer do
not ask for the credit choose C and seller agent S relies on trust the move
T 
 
ii If x  yand r   q or x   yand r   q   both m types of the buyer
ask for the credit choose C x and C y respectively and seller agent S
relies on N 
iii If x   y and q    r  q both the outcome in i as well as the one in
ii are pure strategy equilibria
Proposition  considers only pure strategy equilibria More specically
 it neglects
the multiplicity of best replies in unreached information sets what can be easily
justied by perfectness considerations Selten
   or by requiring sequential
rationality Kreps and Wilson
  	
 as well as the generically mixed strategy
equilibria
In a mixed strategyequilibrium seller agent S as well as one of the buyers types
engage in random choice behavior If m  m is randomizing
 S must use T with
probability  m 

v      I

 v    if m    is supposed to do so
 this
probability must be     v   I  D v This shows that usually at most one
mtype of the buyer can engage in random choice behavior
For seller agent S to be indierent between T and N one needs
III q    r
when m    uses   
 whereas one must have
III q     r
when m  m relies on     Inserting equation III  allows us to rewrite these
equations in the form
III   qryrq
xqr with 
 q    
and
  
III   rq
yqr
with  q   

respectively
The condition       is equivalent to
III    yr
yrrx   q  
yr
yr    
whereas for       the equivalent inequalities are
III r   q   yr
yr

The possible equilibria as depending on the population share q of trustworthy































































































































































    m
 

Figure III The pure strategy above the qaxis and mixed strategy below
the qaxis equlibria as depending on q
In the interval    q    y r   yr the only equilibrium is C x  C y  N
In the neighboring interval    y r    yr  q  r
 this equilibrium coexists
with both mixed strategy equilibria      m and        Only
the mixed strategy equilibrium      m remains when q increases to r 
q    y r   yr     r x where it coexists with both pure strategy equi




 For   q     y r   yr     rx






Mixed strategy equilibria allow for a more continuous transition from one pure
strategy equilibrium to another when q changes Here we wanted to illustrate that
such a transition is only possible via adjusting the probability  or 
 respectively
Neither the probability  m nor   
 determining how seller agent S behaves

depends on the population share q of trustworthy buyers
 respectively debtors
Notice also that only in case of   
 ie in case of the mixed strategy equilibria





and C x  C y  N one either has       or     
 ie no intentional
type signaling For x   y and        observing whether or not a credit has
been granted is an important signal nevertheless as can be seen from equation
III  dening the corresponding posterior beliefs of seller agent S Whenever
       and x   y holds
 there is unintentional signaling of the buyers mtype
When demonstrating that banks may crowd in or out trustworthiness we only
rely on pure strategy equilibria In the following the mixed strategy equilibria
will thus be neglected
 Survival conditions for bank
Even when the bank is not formally included as an active player
 its existence

especially over an evolutionary time span
 presupposes that it does not incur a
loss The solution
 described in Proposition  
 does not actually involve credit
applications The long run existence of the bank or
 more generally
 of the bank
system is thus not endangered
The solution
 described in part ii of Proposition 
 however
 involves active bank
participation so that one has to check the no lossconstraint for this solution which
exists when
IV  x  y and r   q
 
or
IV x   y and r   q  
According to this solution the bank grants the credit tom  m with probability qx
and to m    with probability   q y so that its no expected lossconstraint
is
IV qxI     qy I D      
since it earns I in case of encountering m  m and loses    I D in case of
m    when it has to pay the price and receives only ID The lower bound for
q implied by IV is given by
IV q  yID
xIyID

Due to II the right handside of IV is positive and smaller than   For
x  y it becomes
IV q  ID
IID

In case of x   y the right handside of IV is smaller than the one of IV
This substantiates the obvious intuition that better banks in the sense of larger
dierences x y are protable under more general circumstances Our conclusions
are summarized by
Proposition 
The solution prescribing the C choice for both buyer types m  m and m    and
the N choice for seller agent S is sustainable in the sense of no expected loss by
the bank only if
IV r   q  ID
IID
for x  y
 
and
IV r   q   and q  yID
xIyID
for x   y
By using inequality III condition IV can be expressed as




It is interesting that the interval IV for q does not depend at all on the 
for both mtypes identical  probability x  y of accepting a credit application
All that matters in case of x  y is the a prioriprobability q of the mtypes
representing the population share of trustworthy buyers
To illustrate condition IV one can look at the extreme case x   and y   
when the bank accepts the credit application by m  m and rejects the one by
m    with certainty For this case IV becomes    q    and implies no
essential restriction at all Since IV is just the limiting case in the sense of
jx  yj   
 all our results are summarized by
Theorem 
The further reduced game of trust with bank has two possible solutions in pure
strategies namely
i the one with both m types of the buyer choosing C and the seller agent S
choosing the move T when
IV q   r
 and
ii the one with both m types of the buyer choosing C x and C y respectively
and the seller agent S choosing the move N when
 
IV	 R   q  L
where R and L are dened as in IV	
The interval IV	 for q     may
 of course











For inequality IV the result of Theorem  is graphically illustrated in Figures
IV  and IV visualizing the qinterval    Since x  y the left handside of
IV	
 the parameter R dened in IV
 is larger than r Figure IV  illustrates
the case where
IV  R   r   yID
xIyID
whereas Figure IV assumes the inverse inequality
IV   r  yID
xIyID
 R
  L r R 
                        
q































































































Figure IV The case IV and IV 
If inequality IV is reversed
 the equilibrium prescribing the credit application
C x
 respectively C y by both mtypes of the buyer together with N choice of
the seller agent S does not exist as a sustainable solution since it is inconsistent
with the no expected losscondition for the bank
 
  r L R 
                        
q
























































































Figure IV The case IV and IV  
 The evolution of trustworthiness
An evolutionary game see the survey of evolutionary game theory of Hammer
stein and Selten
  
 as well as of Weibull
   is dened by its strategy setM
as well as by its reproductive success function R mfm specifying for all pairs
mfm with mfm  M the success of an mtype when confronting an fmtype
For the case at hand we assume
V  M  fm  g with m satisfying II	
The success of anmtype buyer is just the material success implied by the solution
This implies a major dierence between utilities resulting from material payos
and the payo componentm in Figure II which can determine the buyers success
only indirectly
 namely via inuencing the buyers solution behavior
Notice
 however
 that for the further reduced game of trust with bank of Figure
II this distinction does not really matter The mtype of the buyer neither
chooses E or P so that m never enters the solution payo of m  m For m   
it
 furthermore
 vanishes by assumption
Now in our case an mtype cannot recognize the fmtype of its encounter We
therefore have to adapt R mfm to the case of incomplete information see orig
inally Gth
   by relying on the expected success function
V R m q for m M  fm  g
 
where R m q is the expected material payo of an mtype buyer









for m  m
for m   
in the range q   r It seems natural to assume that the population share q
of trustworthy buyers or debtors is a function g t of time t which increases
decreases with t when R m q t   R   q t respectively vice versa Since






this solution implies that q must decrease in the interval q   r any reasonable
concept of evolutionary stability will imply such a result
Proposition 	




the population share q of trustworthy buyers
will decrease in the interval q   r
Let us now turn to the solution C x  C y  N under assumption IV guar
anteeing that it exists for all q in the generic qinterval IV	 This solution
implies




v     I

y v   I  D
for m  m
for m   
The condition R m q   R   q is equivalent to
V v x  y   xI   y I D
Proposition 

Assume that condition IV
 holds ie that the q interval IV for the solu 
tion C x  C y  N is non empty In this q interval the population share q of
 	
trustworthy buyers will increase in case of inequality V whereas it will decrease
when
V v x  y  xI   y I D
In the following we will rely on Propositions  and  when demonstrating the
possible crowding in or crowding out of trustworthiness due to the existence of
the bank When doing so we encounter two major problems
 namely
 the existence of two pure strategy solutions for the same generic parameter
region
 eg for the qinterval from r to R in Figure IV 
 and
 the nonexistence of any pure strategy solution which
 in view of Proposition

 is solely due to the survival conditions of the bank see the interval from
  to L in Figure IV  and from  to r in Figure IV
The rst problem could be resolved by applying the theory of equilibrium se
lection Harsanyi and Selten
  		 Here we
 however
 do not want to burden
our approach by imposing the more restrictive rationality requirements of equilib
rium selection Instead we simply will rely on an ad hocselection of the solution
candidate when justifying a case of crowding in or crowding out business ethics
The second problem of no pure strategy equilibrium simply states that the banking
system
 as captured by our model
 cannot exist when such circumstances prevail
We therefore will capture such situations by the basic game of trust without a
bank see Figure II where q decreases over the whole range notice that for the
range q  r
 where the seller wants to use N 
 this presupposes that T is sometimes
chosen by mistake
 see Gth and Kliemt
  
Keeping this in mind we can return to Figures IV  and IV and indicate the
movement of q over time by horizontal arrows for the respective qintervals Here





whereas the arrows below refer to the solution C x  C y  N
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Figure V The case IV and IV 







































































































Figure V The case IV and IV  
The dotted arrow in the left interval above the qaxis indicates the slow decline
of q which would result in case of rare mistakes by the seller who wants to use N
in the interval q  r see Proposition  
 but occasionally fails to do so see the
related idea of limit evolutionarily stable strategies suggested by Selten
  	
Arrows below the qaxis and outside the qinterval between L and R result from
the nonexistence of the bank where q
 according to the previous results of Gth
and Kliemt   and   must always decline Of course
 this decline is fast
in the range q   r and slow dotted arrows in the range q  r where it depends
how rarely N is chosen by mistake
In the qinterval between L and R the direction of the arrows below the qaxis
depends on whether condition V or V holds In view of Proposition  the
qshare of trustworthy buyers increases in case of V and decreases if V
holds
What remains is the case where inequality IV is reversed
 ie where the
interval IV	 or IV is empty Here the arrows below the qaxis are simply
the same as the ones above the qaxis see Figure V since we interpret this


































































Figure V The case of IV being inversed
 A case of crowding in
To provide a case of crowding in trustworthiness one obviously must rely on the
equilibrium C x  C y  N together with inequalities IV and V implying
generic region     where q increases see Figures V  and V Clearly for
any initial population composition q  with L  q   R the share q of trustworthy
types will increase till it reaches the evolutionarily stable bimorphism q  R
for IV and V Thus depending on the initial conditions crowding in of
trustworthiness in the sense of an increase of q is possible In the following we
want to compare the result q  R with the situation where no banking system
exists
Recall that without the bank only q     is evolutionarily stable see Gth and
Kliemt
   and   Thus for crowding in it suces to specify a case where




Let us explore the three conditions for
VI  x      and y  
where  with      	 will be assumed to be rather small Substituting VI 
into IV
 IV	


























respectively Since the limiting inequalities for    are






VI    q   

and
VI v   I

this shows that crowding in of trustworthiness is possible and
 furthermore
 generic
The smaller  the larger the qinterval VI over which q will increase according
to the solution C x  C y  N
Corollary 
If the bank can distinguish between the m types of the buyer ie if x   y
crowding in of trustworthiness is possible and generic in view of the solution
C x  C y  N
The result is visualized by Figure VI  Relying on the solution C x  C y  N
whenever q  R the population share q of mtypes increases fast between L and





applied For q  L the solution C x  C y  N would imply a loss of the bank




with rare trembles in the sense
of unintended choices N or must fall back on the game of trust without a bank

ie q must decline slowly The attraction set of q   R with q      is thus the
interval from L to  whereas it is the interval from  to L for the alternative stable
conguration q    



















































































Figure VI Crowding in of trustworthiness to q   R in the range from L to  
 A case of crowding out compared to costly detection




only q    is evolutionarily stable Thus
crowding out in the sense of a decline of q is implied by any initial share q  of




is played If    q   r
 rare
trembles would induce a further





does not deny the existence of the banking system

but implies its factual irrelevance This
 however
 does not question the evidence
of crowding out If inequality V holds




and C x  C y  N
 imply that q must decline over the whole range
see Figures V  and V Thus for V crowding out is also possible when
C x  C y  N is played if it exists and does not imply negative prots for the
bank
One may want to justify the fact that the initial q  is positive One possibility
is to assume that the banking system substitutes costly
 but perfectly reliable
detection A signaling institution can be either a detection agency or an intrarm
organization Such institutions provide a reference case for which trustworthiness
is evolutionarily stable
 ie where a population share q  with q      of mtypes
would nally result For the case of costly
 but perfectly reliable detection the
bimorphism
VII  q      	K
r
for    K  r	
is evolutionarily stable see Gth and Kliemt
   Here K measures the ma
terial cost of the detection agency which




 for a more general analysis
 is assumed to perfectly recognize the
buyers mtype
To provide a case of crowding out compared to q 
 dened in VII 
 we can rely





would predict a decline of
q
 ie the crowding out of trustworthiness Now for all cost parameters K with
r
	
  K    
 still allowing the existence of an evolutionarily stable bimorphism q 

one has q    r when r	    r   K Given this constraint for K the condition
K  r
	
holds as well and thus imposes no further restriction Crowding out
trustworthiness in the form of a qdecline starting from q    r is therefore possible




the qshare of trustworthy buyers will decline fast
in the range r  q  q  and only slowly after reaching the range    q  r when
assuming the no solutioninterpretation see Figure IV
The result is graphically illustrated in Figure VII 






























Figure VII Crowding out of trustworthiness in the range from   to
q   r   Kr for K  r   r
If the institution of perfectly reliable detection
 leading to q   r   K r
 is






for q   r and on the no solution for q  r
 then q will decline
fast from q  to r and slowly from r to  
 Conclusions
Business ethics have been specied in our analysis as the trustworthiness of buyers

respectively debtors More specically
 one can essentially distinguish two m
types
 the trustworthy ones who would pay the price
 regardless of whether it is

guaranteed by the bank or not
 and the opportunistic exploiters who are unreliable
as buyers and as debtors
Business has been modelled by the game of trust with the interpretation that
delivery precedes payment as it is typically true in actual business To guarantee
that the price will be paid after the delivery the buyer can ask for a credit We
have referred to this situation as the game of trust with bank which is a game
of incomplete information since only the buyer knows his mtype
In the tradition of the indirect evolutionary approach the game has rst been
solved what then allows to study the evolution of q
 ie of the share of trust
worthy buyers
 respectively debtors One way of demonstrating the crowding in
or out of trustworthiness is to introduce path dependence
 ie an initial share
q  of trustworthy types
 and to show that q will become larger crowding in or
smaller crowding out than q  Here we did not conne ourselves to postulating
arbitrary initial conditions q 
 but have also described alternative institutional
set ups which would guarantee such initial conditions When demonstrating the
possible crowding in of business ethics by banks we have compared our results
to the basic game of trust with no type information To illustrate that also
crowding out is possible our standard of comparison has been the evolutionary
stable bimorphism which exists in case of detection agencies Here we therefore
have compared the institution of banks with the one of detection agencies
A major simplication of our analysis is that we have investigated the ethical
impact of banks without including the bank as a player The advantage of this is
that our results do not depend on more or less arbitrary assumptions of what the
bank decides when
 on what it knows when deciding and on how it evaluates the
various possible outcomes
What essentially matters is the banks ability to distinguish between trustworthy
and unreliable debtors in our model captured by the dierence x   y If
 for
instance
 x  y
 there is no multiplicity of pure strategyequilibria for x  y
one has   y r    yr      rx  r
 see Figure III  This also excludes

the possibility of just one mixed strategyequilibrium Furthermore
 according to
the solution C x  C y  N the share q would always have to decline in case of




Proposition  states similar
results for x  y cooperation
 purely based on trust
 exists only for q   r as for
the basic game of trust with no type information More interesting results require
x   y and thus the banks ability to be better than the seller in distinguishing
between mtypes In our view
 this is what one naturally would expect from a
bank which can inquire more thoroughly than a seller whether or not a customer
is reliable
The banks fees for the credit guarantee I





 and the deposit
D
 which it requires
 are inuential
 too But with regard to crowding in or
out trustworthiness the essential parameter seems to be the discrepancy between
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